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Abstract
Rawls (1971,1993) suggests that interpersonal comparisons of well-being should be based on a
primary goods index, but it is well-known that in general this approach is not compatible with
the Pareto principle. This is the indexing impasse. Sen (1985,1991) argues that this is partly
due to the fact that the approach does not take note of the citizen’s orderings of these bundles
of valuable objects. He suggests an «intersection approach», which is an incomplete approach
to interpersonal comparisons based on judgements that are shared implications of the relevant
set of weighting schemes. In this paper, we show that «the intersection approach» does not
provide any solution to the indexing impasse. Unless the individuals have identical preferences,
«the intersection approach» is incompatible with the Pareto principle.
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21. Introduction
Considerations of well-being are essential for any consequensialistic theory of social choice.
Within the welfaristic framework, these considerations are all that matters, where well-being is
defined by the concept of utility. This approach has been criticised from different perspectives.
On the one hand, it has been argued that welfarism contains an unsatisfactory representation of
individual advantage. On the other hand, it has been claimed that it is impossible to apply
welfarism in practice. We might label these the fundamental and pragmatic argument against
welfarism.
The underlying idea of the pragmatic argument is that in public debates we have to base
interpersonal comparisons on «objective features of citizens’ social circumstances open to
view» (Rawls (1993), p. 181). Welfarism implies that interpersonal comparisons should be
based on comparisons of preference satisfaction, which in general is considered to be non-
observable. Thus, the welfaristic framework violates the constraint of availability of
information to which any practicable normative theory is subject.
The fundamental critique of welfarism is concerned with the substantive claims of this
framework. Rawls (1971,1993) argues that utility or well-being is not the relevant feature of
states of affairs. Appropriate claims should refer to an idea of rational advantage that is
independent of any particular comprehensive doctrine of the good, and for this purpose Rawls
suggests a list of primary goods. Sen (1985,1992), on the other hand, defends the focus on
well-being in social choices, but argues against the idea of well-being implicit in welfarism. Sen
claims that «functionings are constitutive of a person’s being, and an evaluation of well-being
has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements» (Sen (1992), p. 39).1
The frameworks of Rawls and Sen differ, but formally they are closely related. In order to
appeal to these positions in public debates, both theories demand that we identify the relevant
elements (functionings or primary goods) and determine how valuable these elements are. In
this paper, we presuppose agreement about a list of valuable functionings (or primary goods),
and deal with the question about how to weight these relevant elements in social choices. In
particular we shall consider the tension between this exercise and the Pareto principle. In the
Rawlsian framework, the issue has already been elaborated on by, among others, Gibbard
(1979).2 However, Sen (1994) argues that the well-known indexing impasse partly follows
                                               
1 We will not deal with the issue of capability in Sen’s theory; see Sen (1992).
2 See also Plott (1978), Blair (1988), and Arneson (1990).
3from «not allowing sufficiently enriched information within the preferential structure» (Sen
(1994), p. 14). In particular, Sen argues that «[i]t would be hopeless to look for an indexing
rule… without taking – direct or indirect – note of the citizens’ orderings of these bundles»
(Sen (1991), p. 15).
Sen argues in favour of an «intersection approach», which «articulates only those judgements
that are shared implications of all the possible alternative weights» (Sen (1993), p. 47). Let us
name this the unanimity criterion. If we apply this line of reasoning in ordinal interpersonal
comparisons, we get the following criterion.
The ordinal unanimity criterion: If the bundle of functionings of person A is considered better
than the bundle of functionings of person B by every relevant weighting scheme, then person A
is better off than person B.
Surely, in most cases, the unanimity criterion will not be applicable for a wide range of
distribution problems, but this does not bother Sen: «The possibility remains that… there may
well be substantial incompleteness, which the respective theories of justice would have to take
into account» (Sen (1991), p. 21-22).
In order to make sense of this criterion, though, we have to delineate the relevant set of
weighting schemes. In much of Sen’s writings, he indicates that the set of actual preference
structures is a good candidate.
(a) The ordinal actual unanimity criterion: If the bundle of functionings of person A is
considered better than the bundle of functionings of person B by every person in society, then
person A is better off than person B.
However, we might argue that it should be legitimate in a normative debate to appeal to
weighting schemes that are not represented by any actual preference structure. In that case, if
we allow every weighting scheme that assigns non-negative weights to all the valuable
functionings, we end up with a dominance criterion:
(b) The ordinal dominance criterion: If person A has more of every valuable functioning than
person B, then person A is better off than person B.
In the analysis, we will apply the dominance criterion in various settings, because this is
sufficient in order to clarify the tension between «the intersection approach» and the Pareto
4principle. Of course, the dominance criterion is a minimal version of the unanimity criterion,
and hence the same results will be present for any extended version of this principle.
However, before we elaborate on this possible conflict, let us briefly comment on the
acceptability of the ordinal dominance criterion. There are two possible objections to this
criterion, both related to the issue of preference satisfaction. First, we might argue that person
B is better off than person A, because possibly person B gets a larger amount of the
functionings which he or she values highly (the taste argument). Second, we might argue that
person B is better off than person A because possibly the intensity of the preferences of person
B is stronger than the intensity of the preferences of person A (the intensity argument). The
taste argument is the essence of the «extended sympathy» approach developed by Sen (1970)
and Harsanyi (1977), which states that any evaluation of a person’s well-being should have to
take into account both the objective circumstances and the subjective attitudes. The intensity
argument is part of a more general problem, stressed by among others Sen (1991, 1992) in his
discussion of the Rawlsian framework, namely the problem that different people may have
different abilities to convert something into a valuable dimension.
Sen (1992, p. 54) circumvents these objections in his discussion of «the intersection approach»
by suggesting the possibility of defining preference satisfaction as one valuable functioning.
However, in our view, this does not produce a satisfactory solution to the taste problem, as
long as there is a plurality of betterness orderings defined over the extended bundle of
functionings which then should have to be taken into account. Moreover, within a pragmatic
framework, there is an easier way out. Both objections can be overruled because they demand
interpersonal comparisons of preference. Hence, as part of a practicable normative theory, we
can read the dominance criterion as follows.
The practicable ordinal dominance criterion: If person A has more of every valuable and
observable functioning than person B, then we should consider person A as better off than
person B.
In the following, we have the pragmatic version of the dominance criterion in mind, where we
assume that preference satisfaction is non-observable. The question is now: Can this criterion
be reconciled with the Pareto principle?
2. Preliminaries
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{ }N n: , ,...,= 1 2  be a set of individuals. We assume that there are m valuable (and
observable) functionings (or primary goods), such that ( )x x xi i im= 1 ,...,  defines an individual
state for individual i. X i  is the set of all possible individual states for 030000000000
i
, where
this set is defined by X E i Ni
m: ,= " Î ; 030000000000 E
m
 is the 030000000000
m
-
dimensional Euclidean space. We assume that 030000000000
m ³2
, and adopt the following
standard definitions; { }x y k m x yi i ik ik³ Û " Î ³1,..., , , if, additionally, { }$ Î >l m x yil il1,..., :
then x yi i> , finally { }x y k m x yi i ik ik³ Û " Î ³1,..., , . A social state is x x xn= ( ,..., )1 . The
set of all possible social states is X X Ei N i
m n:= ´ =
Î
´
.
We assume self regarding preferences, and hence the individual preference relation, Ri , is
defined as an ordering on mE , where Pi  and Ii  are the asymmetric and symmetric factors.3
Moreover, we will restrict the discussion to continuous and monotonic preferences. By
continuity, we have that for all 
i NÎ
 and all 
a E mÎ
, the sets { }A x E xR ai m i0+ = " Î: :  and
{ }A x E aR xi m i0- = " Î: :  are closed; by monotonicity, we have that for all i NÎ  and all
x y Xi i i, Î , { }[ ]" Î > Þk m x y x P yik ik i i i1 2, ,..., : . Finally, let ( )R R Rn= 1 ,...,  be a profile of
orderings, and R  be the set of all possible profiles of self regarding, continuous, and
monotonic preferences.
Let R be the social preference relation. We will consider the possibility for establishing an
acyclical social evaluation function RRG ®: , where R  is the set of all acyclical social
preference relations on X. Hence, we will neither demand completeness nor transitivity. In the
analysis, we work within a single profile framework, where RR Î*  denotes the actual profile
of orderings in society. Moreover, we impose the weak version of the Pareto condition on the
social preference relation.
The Weak Pareto Condition (WP): For any x y X, Î  and RR Î* :
[ NiyPx iii Î"  ,* ]
[ ]$ Îj N x P yj j j: xPy .
                                               
3 An ordering is a reflexive, transitive and complete binary relation.
63. Analysis
In this section, we will attempt to include «the intersection approach» of Sen in a theory of
justice which satsifies the Pareto condition. However, it might be instructive first to consider
one formalization of Sen’s approach which is in direct conflict with WP.
The Strong Dominance Condition (SDC): For any x y X, Î  and RR Î* : [$ a permutation
function NN ®:s  such that Nixy ii Î">>   ,)(s yPx®] .
SDC is closely related to the well-known Suppes’ principle, but defined in the space of
functionings. It states that if for every position in society there is more of every valuable
functioning in y than x, then we should prefer y. At the outset, this might seem reasonable.
However, as the following observation clarifies, it is in general not possible to reconcile the
weak version of the Pareto condition  and SDC.
Observation
If the individuals do not have identical preferences, then SDC is in direct conflict with WP.
Proof. The proof is trivial, and closely related to the discussion in Sen (1970, chap. 9 and 9*).
Hence, we will only illustrate the argument in Figure 1. In this case, we assume that there are
only two individuals and that the individual states are two-dimensional.
j
             ·yj
       ·xk
                                        ·yk         k
·xj
11, ii yx
Figure 1
In Figure 1, SDC implies that yPx , which contradicts WP.
22 , ii yx
7The problem with SDC is of course that it considers a pair by pair increase in all the available
bundles of functionings an improvement irrespective of the ownership of the bundles. On this
basis, SDC concludes that y is better than x. But since the distribution of functionings is more
compatible with the individual preferences in x than in y, x is better than y according to the
weak version of the Pareto condition .
The tension between SDC and WP does not necessarily imply that «the intersection approach»
is in conflict with the weak Pareto condition in all settings. In our view, it simply tells us that
SDC introduces too broad a version of «the intersection approach» in social choices. The
weak Pareto condition should be considered an appropriate condition when the interests of
individuals are aligned. Hence, the purpose of introducing «the intersection approach» should
be to find some practicable condition which can solve cases of conflict. In this respect, let us
consider the following two-person case in Figure 2.
                                                                     ·xj= yk
                         · yj
·xk
11, ii yx
Figure 2
In Figure 2, person j prefers x and person k prefers y. How should we deal with this conflict?
Following the «the intersection approach», one possibility might be to argue that we should
prefer y to x, because both individuals agree that being individual k in social state x is worse
than being individual j in social state y. In this case, we assign absolute priority to the worse
off, which is the Rawlsian approach to distributive justice. Within our framework, the
Rawlsian idea can be captured by the following condition.
The Rawlsian Dominance Condition (RDC): For any x y X, Î  and RR Î* :
[ { }kmkjj xaEayyxNkj >>ÎÎÎ$ :,, :, , ] xPykjiyx ii ®¹"= ,  , & .
22 , ii yx
8However, we would not like to narrow our discussion to the Rawlsian approach. Our purpose
is to see whether there is any Parertian theory of justice compatible with «the intersection
approach»,and thus we would like to consider a much weaker condition than RDC on the
social preference relation. The opposite extreme of the Rawlsian position would be to only
care about gains and losses in cases of conflict. Within such a «quasi-utilitarian» framework,
would it be possible to say anything about the two-person conflict in Figure 2? This
framework demands a basis for interpersonal comparisons of gains and losses, which we have
not outlined so far. In our view, however, the following version of the dominance criterion
should be a straightforward extension of «the intersection approach» to cardinal comparisons:
The cardinal dominance criterion: If person A loses (gains) more of every valuable
functioning than person B, then the loss (gain) in well-being of person A is greater than the
loss (gain) in well-being of person B.
Let us now reconsider the problem in Figure 2.  In this conflict, the loss imposed on person k
by choosing x instead of y is greater in every observable dimension than the loss imposed on
person j if we make the opposite choice. Thus, according to the cardinal dominance criterion,
also a comparison of gains and losses seems to imply that we should prefer y to x in this two-
person conflict.4
Based on our discussion of Figure 2, it seems reasonable to impose the following very weak
condition on the social preference relation.
The Double Dominance Condition (DDC): For any x y X, Î  and RR Î* :
[ jkkj yxyxNkj >>³Î$  :, ] xPykjiyx ii ®¹"= ,  , & .5
In our view, any reasonable practicable theory of justice based on «the intersection approach»
ought to satisfy DDC. DDC is a very conservative condition, saying that if both a comparison
of gains and losses and the situation of the worst-off in two-person cases support the choice of
one of the social states, then we should prefer this state. However, it turns out that even
                                               
4 What about gains and losses in preference satisfaction? In Figure 2, k is considered to be in the worst off
position in x. Hence, since kj yx = , it seems also reasonable to assume that the loss in preference satisfaction
is greater for person k than for person j.
5 Of course, DDC is subsumed under RDC, and hence any tension between DDC and the weak Pareto principle
is also present between RDC and WP. Moreover, we could have reported a slightly stronger result by imposing
strict inequality between xj and yk in DDC. However, in order to save notation in the proofs, we content
ourselves with discussing this version. The modifications are straightforward.
9though DDC is not in direct conflict with the weak Pareto condition, in general the two
conditions are incompatible.
Proposition
There exists an acyclical social evaluation function G which satisfies WP and DDC if and
only if all individuals have identical preferences.
Proof. Se Appendix.
The line of reasoning in the «only if» part of the proof can be illustrated in Figure 3.
                                                            j                   j
   k                        · zk= wj
             ·xj ·yj=xk
k          ·yk
                                   ·wk
   ·zj
11, ii yx
Figure 3
In Figure 3, we have the choice between wzyx ,,, . The weak Pareto condition demands
yPw zPxÙ , DDC implies xPy wPzÙ , and hence we have a cycle which contradicts the
assumption on G in the proposition.
Thus, «the intersection approach» of Sen does not escape the indexing impasse. Even in it’s
weakest form, this approach is incompatible with any reasonable theory of justice that satisfies
the Pareto principle. In this respect, notice that we have worked with a very broad definition of
a reasonable theory of justice. We have accepted incompleteness, lack of transitivity, the
weakest version of the Pareto principle, and any consequensialistic view on distributive justice.
Hence, the reported result should be of concern for anyone interested in «the intersection
approach».
22 , ii yx
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Let us close this section by briefly commenting on the relationship between the proposition
reported in this paper and the well-known indexing paradox of Gibbard (1979). Gibbard
considered the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons by comparing income sets
within a price regime, and established that this approach, within a Rawlsian framework, would
produce cycles in the social preference relation if combined with the Pareto principle. This
result differs from our proposition in two respects. First, our proposition refers to
interpersonal comparisons that rely on shared implications of preference judgements on
bundles of valuable objects.6 Second, our proposition is of more general concern than
Gibbard’s result, because it covers any view on distributive justice.
5. Concluding Remarks
Do these results imply that «the intersection approach» should be abandoned. In our view, this
is too hasty a conclusion. As Rawls (1971) remarked: «All theories are presumably mistaken
in places. The real question at any given time is which of the views already proposed is the
best approximation overall».7 The welfaristic approach is in line with the Pareto principle, but
(at least) vulnerable to the pragmatic argument. «The intersection approach», defined on some
valuable objects (functionings or primary goods) is sometimes in conflict with the Pareto
principle, but might still be the best approach to interpersonal comparisons within a pragmatic
framework. Why? In our view, it seems implausible that we will ever find a practical public
basis for interpersonal comparisons of preference satisfaction. And an inescapable result of
this (possible) fact might be that any pragmatic theory of justice sometimes will be in conflict
with the Pareto principle.
                                               
6 In some sense, Gibbard’s framework might also be considered part of «the intersection approach», because
the underlying judgements of interpersonal comparisons in Gibbard’s analysis can be expressed as shared
implications of preference judgements on income sets.
7 Rawls (1971), p. 52
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition
Suppose the assumptions of the proposition is satisfied.
(a) We will first establish the following lemma:
Lemma
For any RR Î* , if the individuals do not have identical preferences, then there exist two
individuals i j N, Î , and six bundles a b c d E
m, , , Î  such that cbPj*  & daPk*  & efPk  & fePj
& ac >>  & bd >>  & de >>  & cf >> .
Proof. Define the sets { }A x E xP ai m i+ = " Î: :  and { }A x E aP xi m i- = " Î: : . Moreover, define
an open neighbourhood of f030000000000
a
 as 
( ) ( ){ }N a x E d x ame e: : ,= " Î < , 0>e . If the
individuals do not have identical preferences, then there exist bundles a b E
m, ¢Î  and
individuals i j N, Î  such that; aR b b P ai j¢Ù ¢ .
(i) Let us now prove that there exist two bundles mEcb Î,  such that cbPj* . By continuity the
set 
A j
0-
 is closed, and hence the set 
A E Aj
m
j
+ -= - 0
 is open. Notice that ¢Î
+b A j . Because
A j
+
 is open there exists an open in the neighbourhood of b’ which is contained in 
A j
+
. The
vector 
b b
m
b
mm
= ¢-æèç
ö
ø÷ ¢-
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
æ
èç
ö
ø÷1
e e
,...,
, 0>e , is in the neighbourhood of b’, and hence bP aj .
By continuity, the set { }B x E bP xj m j- = " Î: :  is open. a B jÎ - , and thus there exists an open
neighbourhood of f030000000000
a
 which is contained in 
B j
-
. The vector
c a
m
a
mm
= +æèç
ö
ø÷ +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
æ
èç
ö
ø÷1
e e
,..., , 0>e , is in the neighbourhood of a, and hence bP cj .
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(ii) In this step, we will prove that there exists a bundle mEd Î  such that daPk* . By
assumption, *kaR
¢b , and hence it is easily seen from (i) that monotonicity and transitivity of
preferences implies aPbi . b AiÎ
-
, and thus there exists an open neighbourhood of
f030000000000
b
 which is contained in -kA . The vector 
d b
m
b
mm
= +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷1
e e
,..., , 0>e ,
is in the neighbourhood of b, and hence daPk
* .
(iii) By construction in (i) and (ii), ac >>  & bd >> .
(iv) In this step, we will prove that there exist bundles mEfe Î,  such that efPk*  & fePj* .
From (ii) and (iii) we have that daPk
*  & ac >> . Define d b m b mm= +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷1
e e
,..., , 0>e .
Monotonicity and transitivity of preferences implies that dfPk
* . By continuity, the set
{ }B x E bP xj m j- = " Î: :  is open. a B jÎ - , and thus there exists an open neighbourhood of d
which is contained in 
B j
-
. The vector d b m
b
mm
= +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷ +
æ
èç
ö
ø÷
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷1
e e
,..., , 0>e , is in the
neighbourhood of d, and hence 
bP cj .
From (i) and (iii), we have that cbPj
*  & bd >> . Moreover, we know from the first part of this
step that de >> . Thus, monotonicity and transitivity of preferences implies that cePj* . By
continuity, the set { }B x E bP xj m j- = " Î: :  is open. a B jÎ - , and thus there exists an open
neighbourhood of c which is contained in -jE . But from the first part of this step it follows
that f is in this neighbourhood of c, and hence 
bP cj .
(v) By construction in (iv), de >>  & cf >> .
Hence, the lemma is proven.
(b) We will now prove the «only if» part of the proposition.
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Consider the social states x y z w X, , , Î , which are defined by; ( )x x e x ci j: ,= = = ,
( )y y a y ei j: ,= = = , ( )z z e z bi j: ,= = = , ( )w w d w ei j: ,= = = , and x y z w ek k k k= = = = .
By the lemma and DDC, we have: xPy wPzÙ . By the lemma and WP we have: yPw zPxÙ .
Hence, we have the cycle zPxwPzyPwxPy , , , , which contradicts the assumption on G.
(c) Finally, we will show that when individuals have identical preferences, a version of the
leximin rule satisfies WP and DDC.
Let Rk  be the ordering of a representative individual. For all social states, 
x XÎ
, define a
permutation function, s x N N: ® , as follows; x P x i ji k j x xÞ >s s( ) ( )  and
)()()()(* jijixIx xxxxjki ssss <Ú>® . Define the inverse of the permutation function by;
r sx xi i( ) ( )= -1 . Hence, rx ( )1  is the individual who is ranked as worst off in social state x.
Define the following leximin rule: [ ] yPxxPyjixIyNj jpkjipki xyxy ®Ù<"Î$ )(*)()(*)(   ,: rr ;
otherwise yIx .
It is straightforward to show that the leximin rule above is acyclical and satisfies both WP and
DDC when the preferences are identical.ð
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